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Introduction 
 
 
A Hybrid Security Policy for Europe 
Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense as Leitmotifs 
Claudia Major and Christian Mölling 
Under the term “hybrid warfare” the different methods with which Russia destabilizes 
Ukraine are discussed, be it propaganda or the infiltration of society. However, the prob-
lems that NATO and EU states face in dealing with hybrid threats go far beyond the 
Ukraine conflict – they point to systematic vulnerabilities of Western societies. This 
greater spectrum of risks disappears from view, because the current debate is focused 
on the conflict with Russia and its military dimension. The next conflict may already 
not follow the Ukrainian pattern. Therefore, EU and NATO must place systematic 
vulnerabilities at the center of a hybrid security policy, which should build upon a 
reorganized relationship of resilience, deterrence, and defense. 
 
“Hybrid warfare” means to use, in a co-
ordinated way, conventional military and 
unconventional civilian and military means 
in a conflict. Currently the term is almost 
exclusively defined in light of Russian be-
havior in Ukraine, which applies tools such 
as propaganda and military personnel with-
out insignia. However, the unique security 
political challenge is to shape a future 
hybrid security policy, rather than adding 
interpretations of the current Ukraine con-
flict. 
The current crisis highlights the general 
vulnerabilities of EU and NATO states – they 
are largely unprepared for this form of con-
flict, which other actors could also wage 
against Europe in the future. EU and NATO 
states should seize the opportunity that 
comes with the current security political 
awareness and willingness to act, which 
emerged with the Ukraine crisis, to develop 
a “Hybrid Security Policy Action Plan”. It 
should be guided by two questions: Which 
European weaknesses could opponents 
exploit? How can Europe prepare itself and 
reduce such risks? 
Civilian Tools in a Military Context 
Hybrid tactics are traditional components 
of warfare. It is a basic principle of strategy 
that all means are employed to assert one’s 
interests and that this is most effective if 
done in an orchestrated fashion. 
The distinguishing feature of hybrid 
tactics is the use of civilian tools in violent 
conflicts. In hybrid conflicts, armed forces 
are not primary a tool to exert military 
force: They rather serve as a means to create 
a scenario of intimidation. The idea of war 
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as a struggle between two armies does not 
apply here. Consequently, military responses 
by NATO-forces are not the first or most 
appropriated security policy tool. Instead, 
irregular means are used to bring a conflict 
into an area in which the (military) capabil-
ities of the opponents are less decisive. It 
is about using the weaknesses of the oppo-
nent, particularly the vulnerabilities of 
societies. Thus, the gray area between peace 
and conflict expands – violence is still a 
core means, it is not clearly attributable to 
either party to the conflict, nor of a defi-
nite military character. This makes a joint 
reaction of the international community 
more difficult and undermines the inter-
nationally recognized prohibition on the 
use of force. 
Russian actions help to reveal Europe’s 
difficulties in responding to hybrid ap-
proaches, which often use tools that run 
counter to European norms – such as the 
incitement of ethnic minorities. Therefore, 
such a course of action exploits Europe’s 
values by turning them into weaknesses. 
Four Kinds of Vulnerability 
The EU and NATO states are vulnerable 
in four areas. Besides the potential use of 
hybrid tactics, they also have to think 
of the classic military conflict. 
Territorial integrity: The likelihood of 
a military conflict between EU/NATO and 
other actors has increased. One reason is 
military weakness: NATO itself has noted 
that it is not sufficiently prepared for a 
large interstate conflict. Other actors may 
be tempted to make use of this weakness 
to advance their own interests militarily. 
Particularly the Baltic States fear such a 
scenario. 
Another reason could be that the EU and 
NATO states can hardly ignore conflicts on 
their borders – because it would destabilize 
the border region, because it affects their 
security interests or because conflict could 
spread. This is one of the reasons why Euro-
pean states get involved in the fight against 
the Islamic State (IS). 
Both Ukraine and IS show that organized 
force – in various forms, and carried out by 
diverse actors – remains a core component 
of the continuous change of global and 
regional orders. As the EU and NATO could 
themselves become the targets of violence 
or could be hit by its effects, they must 
mitigate these risks. 
Political cohesion: The Ukraine crisis has 
made it clear that the EU and NATO states 
only have influence when they act together. 
Bilateral negotiations and national meas-
ures against Russia would hardly have car-
ried any weight. The unity of Europeans is 
at the same time a weak spot. In the current 
conflict, it depends significantly on the 
degree to which countries are affected: states 
that directly border Russia, with dependen-
cies (such as on energy) or with historically 
strained relationships react more sensitive-
ly to Moscow’s threats. Though Russia’s 
behavior reverberates throughout Europe, 
parts of Eastern Europe feel much more 
directly threatened. The Baltics, for example, 
recall the Soviet annexation of 1940, while 
for other countries, especially in the South 
and West, Russia itself is not the main prob-
lem. France, for example, is more worried 
about instability in the Sahel. 
The Europeans can only act jointly if 
they first agree on a common analysis of 
the problem and the type of response. Up 
until now, however, they have interpreted 
the conflict in Ukraine differently, for one 
thing because there are doubts concerning 
the accountability of hybrid actions: Who 
is involved and what kind of action is 
required? This uncertainty has the poten-
tial to divide Europe politically. 
Interruption of global interdependences: 
One of Europe’s main vulnerabilities comes 
from its interdependence. In the course 
of globalization, Western societies have 
become enormously dependent on inter-
national infrastructures and trade-, service-, 
human-, and capital flows. The linkages are 
not restricted to European territory only, 
but are of a global nature – trade, energy, 
raw materials, or infrastructure, like inter-
net communication. The openness from 
SWP Comments 22 
April 2015 
2 
which Europe profits also makes it sus-
ceptible to disruptions of its global inter-
dependences. 
“Internal” vulnerabilities of open socie-
ties: One significant lesson from the Ukraine 
crisis for EU and NATO is that an escalation 
is not likely to begin with an attack of 
armored divisions from the East, but rather 
through the destabilization from within, 
such as through the incitement of minor-
ities. The Baltic States, for example, fear 
their Russian minorities be instrumental-
ized. Both the UK and France ponder how 
to handle returning IS fighters and home-
grown terrorism. 
This points to the growing significance 
of the social space as a point of reference 
for security precautions, in addition to the 
state and territorial borders of Europe. Also, 
the radicalization of people, for example 
through IS, occurs within European soci-
eties. The pluralism of European society 
means that different ethnic and religious 
communities jointly live in social spaces. 
This increases vulnerability if communities 
with incompatible values clash, if they 
are excluded, or if they no longer offer an 
identity for their members and they in 
turn then search for new guiding prin-
ciples. Such situations cannot only breed 
extremists in the country itself, but could 
also instrumentalize those from outside. 
Next to these social vulnerabilities, the 
technical foundations of social life are also 
increasingly subject to risks. Infrastructure, 
which ensures essential functions of our 
societies – supply of water and power, 
transport, finance- and economic systems – 
are often privately owned. They are profit 
motivated and are not designed to work 
under conflict conditions. 
Three guiding themes 
The EU has put the theme of hybrid warfare 
on the agenda of the next defense summit 
in June 2015. NATO also wants to present a 
concept. To realize an effective hybrid secu-
rity policy, EU and NATO should 1) better 
connect existing instruments of security 
policy and risk management, namely 
resilience, deterrence, and defense; and 
2) readjust the mix of civilian and mili-
tary shares in those three themes. 
Resilience: The interconnectedness and 
openness of Western societies are simulta-
neously one of their greatest strengths and 
weaknesses. Their resilience needs to be 
increased: Societies have to be empowered 
to better resist and to quickly recover from 
various attacks on their values and every 
day functioning. As this must happen before 
hybrid tactics are applied, prevention 
becomes essential, including better early 
warning. The weaknesses that could be 
taken advantage of reach from economic 
dependence to discontent minorities; there-
fore, measures need to cover a wide range 
of areas – infrastructure as well as the free-
dom of the press and opinion. 
Strengthening social unity: This demands 
a migration and integration policy that 
regards the diversity of societies as a basis 
worth safeguarding and manages immigra-
tion. These are in turn supported by eco-
nomic, social, and education policy. It is 
necessary to integrate minorities in a way 
that renders them less sensitive to sedi-
tion and radicalization. In the Baltics, for 
example, this could be achieved among 
others through better youth work and an 
improved Russian-language media offer. 
Also, border security and international 
trade offer tools to increase resilience. This 
would include, for example, securing the 
borders between the Baltic States and Russia 
to prevent the infiltration of irregular 
troops. 
Increasing buffers in daily necessities: The 
resilience of the technical foundations of 
societies relies above all else on redundan-
cies, network structures, and alternative 
supply routes – in the field of energy, for 
example, through the diversification of 
sources. 
Deterrence: Military conflict – as a con-
ventional war or as part of hybrid warfare – 
remains a risk for which Europeans must 
prepare. The goal of deterrence is that op-
ponents perceive the risks associated with 
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an attack as higher than the anticipated 
gains, and consequently refrain from it. 
During the Cold War, deterrence primar-
ily had a military and a nuclear component. 
These dimensions remain relevant, but the 
prevention of an escalation brought about 
by hybrid means requires civilian tools, 
which can react quickly and directly to at-
tempts to exploit weaknesses and depend-
encies. In addition to the measures describ-
ed under “resilience”, internal security is 
crucial, the functioning of police and ad-
ministrations; for example, Special Forces 
can support border security, or police and 
the judiciary can ensure the maintenance 
of the public order. 
Defense: The most likely sort of scenario 
for which the military must prepare itself 
continues to lie somewhere between defense 
and crisis management: Should deterrence 
fail, the defense of territory and national 
institutions against a military attack 
remains the central task. However, crisis 
management cannot be neglected, because 
EU and NATO states cannot guarantee their 
security through territorial defense alone. 
In light of their global interdependences, 
they will be required to defend their secu-
rity outside of Europe as well. The military 
here is an instrument of last resort in acute 
emergencies. The use of political and eco-
nomic tools to defend and support a stable 
international order remains the priority, 
because such an order strengthens the 
openness and interconnectedness from 
which Europe benefits so tremendously. 
This applies even more as none of the 
emerging powers has so far been willing 
to take on international responsibility to 
a great extent. 
Action Plan “Hybrid Security Policy” 
Hybrid security policy is primarily a task of 
the states, as most opportunities for action 
are at the national and regional levels. How-
ever, states often do not possess the neces-
sary measures, or to an insufficient degree. 
Therefore, EU and NATO states together 
with the EU institutions should develop a 
European Action Plan for Hybrid Security 
Policy. 
That would also serve to strengthen 
the political unity required for successful 
action. It could be useful to carry out an 
analysis of where and how Europe’s unity 
is vulnerable and what the consequences 
might be for EU and NATO members should 
single states not receive enough support. 
The findings could increase the willingness 
of states to agree on mutual support and pre-
pare for future crises with practical meas-
ures – before the next real crisis strikes. 
Since the 1967 Harmel Report, security 
remains the sum of defense and detente. 
Therefore, it is not enough to reduce the 
vulnerabilities of EU and NATO states. Per-
manent offers of dialogue and trust-build-
ing measures are needed, which contribute 
to de-escalation and pave the way for a 
cooperative approach to shape the future 
security order. 
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